Unrealistic and Potentially Naïve Strategy
The new Joint Concept for Competing needs to be immediately scrapped.
The new Joint Concept for Competing was released last month and it has five major issues that immediately stand out.
Pretends the military is a scalpel, when its really an axe.
Assumes an unrealistic level of collaboration
Adopts an adversary agnostic approach.
Neglects flushing out “Commercial-Industrial” as an instrument of power
Seems to set the stage for lower levels of military funding
The concept calls for a whole of government approach that includes the kitchen sink of government agencies: diplomatic, economic, financial, information, legal, and intelligence, socio-cultural, commercial industrial, technological, ideological-theological, and public health.
Problem: DoD can barely coordinate and collaborate internally enough to generate a functioning joint force without the COCOMS having to burn through gallons of super glue. Coordinating a coherent response with numerous government agencies with very different cultures and mindsets is just untenable. It also belies an assumption that our allies in the region will act with a single intent when in fact they are likely to act exceedingly calculating given the impact of their direct involvement.
Problem: Assumes that DoD can operate with a nuance that is adjustable and adaptable to all situations. In reality, the military is sharp axe that once you start swinging is hard to stop. Its not a surgeon's scalpel. The military is a storm you unleash as a last resort after economic and political measures have been exhausted. You think we would have learned this from watching Russia and their immunity to economic and political pressure as well as from our own Afghan/Iraq "win hearts and minds" failure. The reality is you want a military who can bash the crap out of an enemy and make them limp back home…not one that is constantly calculating the right level of force. Once the bullets start flying, a “total war” approach is the only way to win.
Problem: The section on adopting an "adversary agnostic" strategy might be the one bothers me the most. How is this helpful in guiding investments? Fighting Russia, Iran and China demand different concepts and types of capabilities. Failure to have a primary target makes this concept even less tenable.
Problem: Despite calling out the commercial sector as an instrument of power, no mention is made in the 91 page document how it will be employed or enhanced to support this concept. That is a big fail given the importance of the tech sector on helping to modernize the U.S. military and China dependence on certain elements of commercial production.
Problem: More worrying is that all of this intergovernmental talk feels like a prep for budget cuts to the military...why do we need all these military capabilities when we have the Commerce and State Department in the mix? In fact, the U.S. military is less ready now for a conflict than it has in many years and needs significant and sustained investments.
If you read nothing else in this concept paper, check out the the "Risks" section. It tells you everything you need to know.
Risk 1: Increased emphasis on competition could affect Joint Force readiness to fight and win an armed conflict. There must be a balance between the expanding focus on competition and preparedness for warfighting. There will be an inherent tension between how to resource the training and equipping of forces for armed conflict (and deterrence thereof) versus how to resource the training and equipping of forces for strategic competition.
Risk 2: Integrated competitive strategies could lead to ineffective campaigns of enormous complexity. Strategic competition is complex by nature, but integrated competitive strategies will reward simplicity and parsimony in design. Senior leaders must be alert to this tension and must continuously strive for the proper balance between complexity and effectiveness.
Risk 3: Relevant interagency and allied partners may be unwilling or unable to align with the Joint Force as part of a USG competitive strategy and/or campaign. The current arrangements and relationships are not well suited for integrated strategy development or campaigning with interorganizational partners. Partners may not align or integrate their efforts for various bureaucratic, organizational, legal, cultural, or financial reasons. Without interagency participation in the process, the Joint Force cannot implement the JCC. If the Joint Force does not undertake the effort to align and integrate with interagency and allied partners, the vision for strategic competition outlined in the JCC could have limited efficacy.
Risk 4: Strategic competition could lead to inadvertent escalation and unintended consequences. Actions taken below the level of armed conflict intended to counter an adversary’s coercion and subversion could create a security dilemma, where other states respond in kind, leading to heightened tensions or even armed conflict. The Joint Force will need to calculate risk very carefully when proposing and executing activities short of armed conflict.
An excellent CSIS analysis captures the bottom line in terms of how ready this concept is to be implemented.
Unfortunately, the document ends by focusing far too much on theory, doctrine, and education—a general problem in almost all recent U.S. approaches to strategy. It does [not] address the needed changes in U.S. force posture, alliances, and partnerships, the tangible aspect of modernization, and the need to reshape the Department’s planning, programming, or budgeting system.
The Structured Approach for Strategic Competition section provides a useful list of issues, but it does not address any practical short-term approach to implementing the new strategy.
The Concept Required Capabilities section presents another long list of analytic tasks rather than proposing a functional approach to implementation.
Perhaps most interestingly is that the FY24 budget does not reflect this new concept. As the CSIS report noted. the FY24 budget provided major funding for countering China, but “avoided dealing with Russia and the Ukraine, did not mention Iran and North Korea, and did not address Joint Concept for Competing in any way.”
These are not credible approaches to real-world action on strategy, planning, and any aspect of budgeting.
The final question is how is this concept helpful to the fight ahead where we need to be focused on integrating cutting-edge commercial tech into warfighting solutions and building capacity into the force and the defense industrial base so that when China does make an overt move towards Taiwan or an ally, we are ready to respond?